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Book Review
Neither Mad nor Bad. The Competing Discourses of
Psychiatry, Law and Politics
Deirdre N. Greig. Jessica Kinglsey Publishers 2002.
The title of this book, as the author reminds us, is derived from Lady Caroline Lamb’s description
of Lord Byron as “mad, bad and dangerous to know”. The phrase serves neatly to encapsulate a
central problem faced by law and psychiatry explored in the book and (the timing of publication
is fortuitous) faced by the government’s draft mental health bill; how to distinguish between
madness, badness and dangerousness? 
Greig’s book focuses in detail on the history of one man in the state of Victoria, Australia and the
responses of the law, psychiatry, politicians and the community to the “problems” presented both
by his behaviour and by his diagnosis of severe personality disorder.
By the age of eighteen, Garry David had accumulated a large number of convictions for separate
offences, mainly of theft. His major term in prison, 14 years for wounding and attempted murder,
came in 1980 when, aged 27, he attempted to ambush police with, it would seem, the desire to be
killed in a dramatic shoot out. Even including this latter drug fuelled incident, David’s criminal
career could not be regarded as exceptional. Yet, as he was approaching the end of his custodial
sentence and was appealing his continued detention as a security patient, the government moved
to pass “one-person” legislation, the Community Protection Act 1990, requiring the Supreme
Court to assess expert evidence of his dangerousness as a basis for his continued incarceration. 
That the state reacted so dramatically and in a way that, arguably, led to David’s death from injuries
inflicted upon himself as part of a campaign of resistance, was not, Greig argues, attributable to
proven criminality or a diagnosed mental illness but rather the use, as a form of professional
knowledge and a basis for policy, of the concept of “dangerousness”; a concept that “signals a self-
fulfilling prophecy of incontrovertible evidence that a dangerous propensity exists” thereby
demonising the subject, arousing public fear and inviting political intervention. 
Although an unexceptional criminal, it must be said that David was a highly unusual prison inmate
who was to develop a broad range of tactics to destabilise both the psychiatric and penal
authorities. This ability was demonstrated first at his trial in 1980 where his disruptive behaviour
ranged from disdain for the court by refusing to stand, to threats of violence, including those of
self-mutilation which resulted in the need for a daily x-ray to guard against his proven ability to
swallow sharp objects and regurgitate them at will. 
This pattern, with inventive variations, continued in custody where David developed and mastered
the arts of prison anarchy; hunger strikes, cell barricades, threats, physical violence, self-mutilation
and the inciting of other prisoners to resist. These cruder activities were accompanied by a written
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campaign and an extraordinary and sometimes highly subtle ability to undermine and create
conflict amongst the prison staff, particularly his treating doctors and nurses. The dimensions of
David’s public persona were amplified by the leaking of official documents to the sensationalist
press detailing, among other things, his puerile and fantastic plans for a war on the public when
released. Such fantasies might have been dismissed were it not for the image that the public were
forming, chiefly through David’s own writing to the press, of a man with extraordinary capacity for
self-harm, of someone beyond pain, lost to himself and capable of anything, of somebody who
must be mad. 
Greig traces how David’s strategies opened up a divide both practically, professionally and
theoretically between the criminal justice and mental health authorities. The difficulty of “placing”
him within a suitable structure of care and containment made the establishment of a suitable
treatment regime impossible. The problem of locating him managerially was in part a product of
the diagnosis of severe personality disorder and the ambiguities this raised as to the
appropriateness and efficacy of treatment. The superadded notion of dangerousness, Greig argues,
was useful because it removed the need for a complete understanding of David’s condition, serving
both as a bridge between criminality and mental illness, making continued incarceration an
acceptable goal, and as a signal of the potential rather than the actual, something seized upon by
the media who distorted David into a “Hannibal Lechter” figure in the minds of the public and
politicians.
Greig’s description of the frenzied way in which the options for Garry David were explored by the
authorities is disturbing because they strongly suggest the issue had been pre-decided. These
included the possibilities of certification, provided psychiatrists would recognise David as
mentally ill, the recommendation, by a special committee set up for the purpose, that personality
disorder be viewed as a mental illness and the enjoining by the Attorney General of the Law
Reform Commission to focus its attentions on that part of the Mental Health Act which
specifically excluded certification of those with an “anti-social personality”. Whilst the
government pursued options for confinement, a specially formed group of four psychiatrists
delivered their, no doubt, unwelcome view that David was not mentally ill for the purposes of
commitment.
The culmination of these efforts was the Community Protection Bill 1990 which, hastily drafted
as it was, did nothing to disguise the government’s central aim of preventing David’s release, the
purposes being, “to provide for the safety of members of the public and the care and treatment of
Garry David … and to provide for proceedings to be instituted in the Supreme Court for an Order
for the detention of Garry David.” The Bill thus shifted the burden of making a decision and the
blame for the outcome to the judiciary. Whether prisoner or psychiatric patient, the court was
empowered, on the finding of a serious risk to the public or likelihood of violence, to order
preventive detention. But the finding of such a risk or likelihood was to be based upon evidence
by experts who had previously been unable to resolve how David should be managed or clarify
their views on his condition. The order for preventive detention which almost inevitably followed
allowed David further opportunities to highlight the conflicts between the law and psychiatry
which had been exposed at the hearings by styling himself a “psychiatric prisoner”. David died in
1993 from complications of his self-inflicted injuries while still engaged in legal testing of the
legislation which kept him a prisoner and the attacks on his body which were, Greig suggests, a way
of demonstrating power over himself of a kind denied to the authorities. 
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Throughout, the charting of David’s convoluted history at the hands of the state, the competition
and contradictions between psychiatry and law and the reactions of politicians to public and media
pressure is done with care and facility. The picture that emerges is that of guild like structures, each
concerned to protect its interests but confronted by the impossible task of overcoming the
incompatibilities. Psychiatrists could agree on a personality disorder but not its type whilst lawyers
struggled with their need for precise meanings requiring of the psychiatrists discriminations they
were not prepared or able to give. The accounts of the Mental Health Review Board hearings on
the arguments as to whether David’s personality disorder was borderline or anti-social are
particularly interesting if unedifying.
The sub-title, the Competing Discourses of Psychiatry, Law and Politics, hints at the author’s
application of arguments and insights from less traditional sources. This accords with the Forensic
Focus series of which this book is part and its intention of embracing such other disciplines as
“language, literature, criminology, ethics and philosophy as well as psychiatry and psychology”.
My feeling is that Greig’s use of, for example, commentators such as Foucault, Gusfield and
Ignatieff is a little coy – these authors might have been mined more substantially, they tend to
appear suddenly as if slotted in rather than contextualised. 
This minor and rather personal quibble aside, this is a book I thoroughly recommend. It has much
of importance to say to anyone in the wide field of subjects touched upon by the series but most
especially to those concerned with the current debate on dangerousness and severe personality
disorder. For politicians who share the concerns over the moves to legislate for broad criteria for
the detention of those with diagnosed DPSD, it should be required reading. The history of Garry
David as told in the book might have been the origin of the phrase “hard cases make bad law” but
what politicians might also learn is that hard law has a nasty propensity for making bad cases.
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